Pragmatics and Games of Partial Information

Abstract

I introduced games of partial information initially in Parikh (1987), later in Parikh (1990, October 1991, 1992, April 2000), and most recently in Parikh (2001), where I considered their use in modeling communication, speaker meaning, and information flow. In this chapter, I look at a medley of topics, some in more detail and others in an exploratory vein. I first clarify some aspects of the basic model in the context of literal content that appear not to have been fully understood; I then discuss the differences between signaling games and partial information games; next I consider the strategic form and Bayesian form representations of these games; I then answer the question about the validity of the interpretive heuristic mentioned in section 2; and finally, I broach the completely new topics of probabilistic communication and situated game theory.KeywordsGame TheoryPrivate InformationMixed StrategyPartial InformationExtensive FormThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.