Practical vs. Theoretical Reason — An Ambiguous Legacy

Abstract

The interrelations of theoretical and practical reason pose a multiplicity of problems which are of considerable urgency both for theoretical and for practical purposes. In order to cover as many of these repercussions within the purview of my discussion, I shall keep my definition of ‘practical reason’ as wide as possible, even at the cost of some vagueness. By practical reason I shall simply mean reason in so far as it is occupied with human action, human doing and making, and with the results of such action. I shall mainly consider certain problems concerning the relationships between practical and theoretical reason from a historical point of view. These historical questions will lead us to important systematical problems. In this paper, I shall touch on these systematical problems only in so far as they arise out of historical material and can be discussed by reference to it. I envisage the task of my paper as providing materials and impulses for deeper systematical discussions.