Abstract
As the existence of non-zero reflection coefficients in the real component of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems, Eve can probe the system by sending the bright light pulses into Alice’s set-up. With the analysis of back-reflections, Eve only takes a few back-reflected photons to intercept information and obtain the raw key bit. In this paper, the attack problems are converted into the information leakage problems. First, we analyzed the Trojan horse attacks with different wavelengths and confirmed its side effects, such as crosstalk and anti-Stokes Raman scattering, by a numerical simulation. Then, based on the wavelength-dependent property of beam splitter, we presented a practical way to estimate the deviation of shot noise and therefore correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelength pulses under joint attacks. Finally, we specified the security bounds of the system through quantifying the excess noise bounds caused by the Trojan horse attacks and provided a theoretical reference for the secret key transmission of system. As a consequence, the transmission errors within the security bounds can be negligible and the legitimate users will not perceive the presence of Eve.
Highlights
Quantum key distribution (QKD) refers to a method in which the two parties of communication share the key by transmitting the information on the quantum channel with the quantum state as the information carrier [1,2,3]
We make use of the wavelength-dependent property of beam splitter (BS), making Eve can estimate the deviation of shot noise and correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelengths pulses
This article analyzed one-way Trojan-horse attacks on continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems
Summary
Quantum key distribution (QKD) refers to a method in which the two parties of communication share the key by transmitting the information on the quantum channel with the quantum state as the information carrier [1,2,3]. Eve uses the heterodyne detection protocol to attack the actual CV-QKD system by switching signals and different wavelengths LOs to estimate the deviation of shot noise and correct the excess noise [23,32,33,34] In this case, even if Bob monitors the total strength or LO strength, Eve can implement Trojan horse attacks without being discovered. Eve’s bright pulse have a side effect, resulting in a large quantum bit error rate that effectively protects the system from our attacks To eliminate this impact, we make use of the wavelength-dependent property of BS, making Eve can estimate the deviation of shot noise and correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelengths pulses.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
