Abstract
This chapter considers two sorts of cases in which it might seem as though an adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee's system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own. Based on these cases, the chapter offers a positive argument in favor of the author's contention that there is no mode of sincere advice in which the adviser puts aside her own system of standards in favor of a competing system of standards. The chapter argues that the nature of sincere advice precludes an adviser's putting aside her own system of standards in favor of a competing system of standards. It follows that a popular Humean view of practical reason is untenable. According to the author, there is no mode of sincere advice in which the adviser puts aside her own system of standards in favor of a competing system of standards. Keywords:advice; advisee's system of standards; Humean view; practical reason; system of standards
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