Abstract
This essay argues that Salomon Maimon's moral philosophy is held together by the same skeptical questioning about the "presentation" of the rational in the sensible that holds together his critique of Kant's account of experience. Granting that Kant has identified the form of rational morality, Maimon asks, 1) how is it possible for this rational form to cause or to apply to actions in a sensible realm otherwise governed by drives and inclinations (quid juris)? and 2) where can we point to an actual presentation of rational morality among the otherwise exclusively inclination-driven human strivings for ends (quid facti)?
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