Abstract

Abstract Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press) and indirectly by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. New York: Oxford University Press). Korsgaard understands Humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, Humanity as self-legislation faces what I call ‘Existential dilemma’: either Humanity has specific content, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings; or Humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived of as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., Humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary natural fact that human beings are social creatures, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call ‘Nature/Nurture dilemma’, which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford University Press). In conclusion, I address the worry that without the necessary practical identity of Humanity we might not be able to extend our practical and moral concerns to distant fellow human beings by sketching an alternative path to extend such concerns.

Highlights

  • Konstantin Dmitrievich Levin is a Russian landowner, brother of Nikolai Dmitrievich Levin and half-brother of Sergei Ivanovich Koznyshev, suitor of the Princess Ekaterina (Kitty) Alexandrovna Shcherbatskaya and amateur hunter, among many other interesting things

  • Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity

  • The Argument from Contingency is supposed to show that Humanity is a necessary practical identity, starting from two premises: 1) human beings need practical identities to act and to live; 2) only a necessary practical identity can guarantee that they have practical identities at all

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Summary

Introduction

Konstantin Dmitrievich Levin is a Russian landowner, brother of Nikolai Dmitrievich Levin and half-brother of Sergei Ivanovich Koznyshev, suitor of the Princess Ekaterina (Kitty) Alexandrovna Shcherbatskaya and amateur hunter, among many other interesting things. Korsgaard’s definition of a practical identity nicely captures what Levin’s attributes have in common: “a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” Levin is a proud Russian nobleman, who speaks Russian as his native language, and even plans to write a book about improving agriculture in his home country. I will focus on the more limited task of attacking the view that one specific practical identity is necessary, namely the practical identity of Humanity It is widely held a conviction that human beings share Humanity as a nontrivial quality, connected with action.

The Moral Route
Humanity as Self-Legislation
The Argument from Contingency
The Existential Dilemma
Humanity as Deep Sociality
The Argument from Publicity
The Morally Neutral Route
Conclusion
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