Practical distinguishing attack against the IoT‐friendly block cipher ALLPC

Abstract

The issue of security and privacy plays an important role in the Internet of Things (IoT) and directly affects its wide applications. In order to meet the security requirements in the IoT environment, a series of lightweight encryption schemes have been proposed. Meanwhile, cryptanalysis against these schemes is critical to the security of IoT. In this paper, a practical distinguishing attack on an IoT-friendly lightweight cipher ALLPC is presented. Specifically, it is found that there exists a fixed point in the differential of ALLPC's S-box, then a differential trail with a period of 14-round has been proposed. By connecting to the periodic differential trail, a differential trail is constructed for the full-round ALLPC with a probability of 2−24. Applying such property, one can distinguish the full-round ALLPC block cipher from a random permutation in about 10 min on a laptop.