以賽局理論分析促進民間參與公共建設(PPP)制度之研究

Abstract

Despite the good intentions for the public sector to use public-private partnerships (PPPs, a common form is Build-Operate-Transfer, BOT), results have been mixed. Together with the global expansion of PPP, governments around the world are keen to know how to establish proper institutions in order to promote PPP programs successfully. However, relevant research is limited and mainly based on rule-of-thumbs. This study aims to improve the quality of PPP research related to institutional issues by a more rigorous way which includes New Institutional Economics (NIE), Transaction Cost Theory (TCE), Game Theory and case study. Two institutional issues, the role of national PPP units and proactive measures of governmental debt guarantees, are selected to demonstrate the value of the proposed research methodology in conducting institution-related research. In addition, the findings of each topic can advance the body of knowledge in PPP implementation. Regarding the role of national PPP units, it is a policy-level institution. Unless its role is clarified, a national PPP unit cannot be successful because it lacks adequate authority to respond appropriately to the changing environment. The PPP activities can be analyzed as a game between the host government and private developers trying to maximize their respective payoffs; thus, in accordance with NIE, a national PPP unit can be considered an endogenous equilibrium outcome of a game. On the basis of this perspective, three game theoretical models are constructed to find equilibriums: a single game for a single authority, repeated games for a single authority, and repeated games for government with multiple subordinate authorities. This part also uses a case study to present the history of PPPs in Taiwan and the evolutionary role of the National PPP Taskforce, Taiwan. National and international data confirm the theoretical model, which indicates that the common role of a national PPP unit is as a trust-creator between the public and private sectors. The contractual arrangement in a PPP contract can be viewed as the project-level institution. Governmental Debt Guarantees (GDGs) are often used to encourage involvement by developers and financial institutions in PPP projects. However, even after demonstrating the bankability of a project and reducing debt cost, the success of the project may be prevented by the lack of long-term commitment from shareholders. Equity contributions by developers in the project company are generally recovered from earnings on short-term construction activities. Based on lesson learned from early PPP projects with GDG, the hold-up problem for government in the view of TCE theory may worsen if the designed contractual structure does not adequately manage opportunistic behaviors from developers. This part empirically examined the effects of a structured GDG mechanism with particular complementary measures applied in joint projects to develop the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations. A GDG game model was then applied to bridge the theoretical gap based on the Taipei MRT experience. The analysis shows that requiring the developer to provide sufficient equity and ensuring the commitment of the lender to provide the loan are the appropriate proactive measures. This pilot study contributes to the theoretical foundation that policymakers need to accelerate the learning process for implementing a PPP. It also provides researchers in the construction field with a more rigorous methodology by combining NIE, TCE, game theory and case study for analyzing other governance structures in the construction field.