Abstract
Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy auction, which allow multiple goods to be sold simultaneously and any combination of goods to be bid and the maximum sum of combinations of bidding prices to be calculated. However, in traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation since the winner determination problem needs to be resolved in terms of sensitive data as above. In order to solve this issue, this paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which we design a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid to enable the auctioneer to pick out the largest bid without revealing any information about bids. Moreover, we design and employ three subprotocols, namely, privacy-preserving winner determination protocol, privacy-preserving scalar protocol, and privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol, to implement the combinatorial auction with bidder privacy and payment verifiability. The results of comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides a better efficiency and flexibility to meet different types of data volume in terms of the number of goods and bidders.
Highlights
IntroductionEvery bidder chooses the sequence of the good number that he wants to own (i.e., bundle) and provides the price that he is willing to pay (i.e., bid)
We propose a privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol that is shown in Algorithm 4
We improve the performance to a linear growth and logarithmic growth, which illustrates that our PP-VCA protocol provides a better scalability in the practice
Summary
Every bidder chooses the sequence of the good number that he wants to own (i.e., bundle) and provides the price that he is willing to pay (i.e., bid). In private-preserving combinatorial auction, a crucial issue to be solved is how to pick out a set of disjoint goods under the price value of which is the maximized. This problem can be classified as an optimization problem. Kikuchi and Thorpe [14] proposed a privacy-preserving combinatorial auction protocol which employed a Shamir secret sharing scheme to share bids between multiple auctioneers, which allows any entity to detect misbehavior of bidders and auctioneers.
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