Abstract
This chapter assesses power-sharing developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo by linking the institutional choices made at the end of violent conflict to party and coalition dynamics. The more corporate consociational structures in Bosnia and Kosovo make real change difficult as it permits multiple veto points and political decision-making levels. Even if established parties lose support at one level, their strength in other institutions provides further opportunities to entrench their influence. North Macedonia is the outlier here. Its more liberal consociational institutions—including fewer veto players—allow for change within ethnic parties, across groups and in the composition of governing coalitions. Liberal consociationalism not only helps to protect the rights of minorities and non-aligned groups, it can also incentivize change among parties with a high degree of ethnic identification.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.