Powerful Particulars as “Autodocuments” in Documentality

Abstract

The purpose of this short paper is to sketch the problem of whether documentality, in the sense of the appearance of evidence, must always take the form of a type-token relationship. In contrast to a type-token epistemology common in the Library and Information Science tradition, the paper argues that there is precedence for a theory of documentality that views evidentiality as a product of the powers of particulars to make themselves present. To make this argument, it appeals to Robert Pagès theory of documents and, over a half century later, Bernd Frohmann’s proposal for a philosophy of information, “Documentality.” Such a theoretical framework as Documentality may center its analysis around the problem of the evidentiality of natural entities rather than sociocultural or bibliographic entities. The paper argues that Documentality offers a theory of evidence or information through functions, performances, and powers rather than through content representation. Such a contrast describes the epistemology of Neo-Documentation versus that of earlier Otletian Documentation and the Library and Information Science tradition that follows from it.