Power without a cause? Germany’s conflict avoidance and the integration of European defence procurement

Abstract

ABSTRACT Germany’s state elites and general public have consistently preferred deepening integration of defence procurement at the European Union (EU) level. However, the German government has repeatedly acted against this well-established preference. First, it wanted the European Defence Agency to become a full-fledged armaments agency but tolerated its marginalization into a symbolic entity. Second, it preferred to ban protectionist defence procurement policies, such as offsets, but voted for a Code of Conduct that legitimized them. Despite Germany’s powerful position, conflict avoidance was its predominant strategy in the EU’s intergovernmental bargains. The government was unwilling to risk confronting other member states but passed the buck to the European Commission, satisficed on second-best outcomes, and thus acted as a power without a cause. By expanding the core state power (CSP) research program beyond its focus on domestic politics, we suggest re-considering CSP-integration as the art of the possible in iterative, mixed-motive situations.