Power transitions, then and now: five new structural barriers that will constrain China’s rise

Abstract

This article shows that China now faces a series of what are termed “structural barriers” that will make it harder for it to rise than was the case for all past rising powers. In the first section, I define the concept “structural barrier” so we can properly identify which ones now constrain China’s ascent. In the next three sections, I briefly review the essential features of three existing structural barriers that have already been identified in the literature: (1) the magnitude of the U.S. military advantage is much bigger than the gap between the number 1 power and the number 2 power in previous eras, (2) it is now far harder—and it takes much longer—to convert economic capacity into top-end military technology than in the past because so many of today’s advanced weapons systems are extraordinarily complex, and (3) as compared to all past rising powers, China is at a relatively much lower level technologically compared to the leading state. The next two sections then, respectively, delineate two additional structural barriers of great importance that must be factored in: (1) the globalization of production in weaponry and key dual-use technologies, and (2) the onset of global demographic aging, something that constrains all of the major powers but is especially acute in China. Overall, this article reveals that the world has changed too much for the power transitions of the past to provide useful guidance regarding the nature of China’s ascent; looking at them is ultimately deceiving, not illuminating, for understanding the possible speed of its rise on the global stage. A concluding section discusses some key implications of the analysis for the security policies of China and the United States.