Abstract

Physical cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks, in which sensitive information can be recovered by analyzing physical phenomena of a device during operation. In this survey, we trace the development of power side-channel analysis of cryptographic implementations over the last twenty years. We provide a foundation by exploring, in depth, several concepts, such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Template Attacks (TA), Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), Mutual Information Analysis (MIA), and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), as well as the theories that underpin them. Our introduction, review, presentation, and survey of topics are provided for the “non expert”, and are ideal for new researchers entering this field. We conclude the work with a brief introduction to the use of test statistics (specifically Welch’s t-test and Pearson’s chi-squared test) as a measure of confidence that a device is leaking secrets through a side-channel and issue a challenge for further exploration.

Highlights

  • Cryptography is defined in Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dictionary as the art and science of “enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code or cipher”

  • We offer a challenge to address an open research question as to which test procedures are most efficient for detecting side-channel-related phenomena that change during cryptographic processing, and which statistical methods are best for explaining these changes

  • We have provided a review of 20 years of power side-channel analysis development, with an eye toward someone just entering the field

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Summary

Introduction

Cryptography is defined in Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dictionary as the art and science of “enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code or cipher”. Over the past two decades, this field of study, dubbed Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), has been active in finding ways to characterize “side-channels”, exploit them to recover encryption keys, and protect implementations from attack. This paper is meant to engage and inspire the reader to explore further To that end, it is replete with references for advanced reading. We close the introduction by reiterating that side-channels can take many forms, and we explicitly call out references for further study in power consumption [7,8], electromagnetic emanations [9,10,11], thermal signatures [12,13,14], optical [15,16], timing [17,18], and acoustics [19]

Measuring Power Consumption
Direct Observation
Simple
10 Array rounds of the target
Classic
Power trace a portion of an
Theory
Practice
Statistics
A Brief Look at Countermeasures
17. Side-channel
18. Mutual
An Expanding Focus and Way Ahead
Contingency
Findings
Summary
Full Text
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