Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War

Caroline A Hartzell,Matthew Hoddie

doi:10.1093/isq/sqz023

Caroline A Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz023

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Abstract

AbstractWhat effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. First, they establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. Second, they foster a sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. We demonstrate the plausibility of a positive relationship between power sharing and the rule of law through an analysis of post–civil war states between the years 1948 and 2006. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment.

Highlights

What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways
Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment
We consider the case of post–civil war Liberia in order to explore the validity of the mechanisms through which we argue power sharing impacts the rule of law

Summary

Introduction

What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways They establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. They foster a sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment. His research focuses on the topics of ethnic conflict and civil war resolution

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Conclusion