Power Projection Operations and Urban Combat: An Avoidable Combination?

Abstract

Abstract : This monograph addresses the relationship between power projection operations and urban combat. The facilities which are required for a power projection operation are typically located in urban areas. US doctrine for urban combat is to bypass urban areas whenever possible due to the difficulty and cost of urban combat operations. The hypothesis of this monograph is that there is a conflict between US force projection doctrine, which is based on the use of theater arrival facilities (typically located in urban areas), and US urban combat doctrine. The monograph investigates whether Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) offers a capability to conduct force projection operations while avoiding urban areas. It investigates whether the US possesses adequate capabilities to conduct Logistics Over the Shore operations, and what US options are if such capabilities are not present. This monograph first investigates the nature of urban combat focused on historical examples. The examples include the Battle for Hue, the Battle for Khorramshahr, the Battle for Manila, the Normandy Campaign, and the Battle for the Falklands. The monograph next investigates the US doctrine for urban combat, with a discussion of both US Army and US Marine doctrine. A discussion of the validity of this doctrine in light of the nature of urban combat follows. The monograph then reviews the US doctrine for force projection operations, focused primarily on the seaborne leg of the strategic mobility system. Finally, what follows is a detailed discussion of Logistics Over the Shore which is proposed as a means for conducting force projection operations in the absence of fixed facilities, thereby avoiding urban areas and the inherent risk of urban combat. Logistics Over the Shore is described, limiting factors are delineated, and the nature of these operations is discussed.