Abstract
ABSTRACTThis article analyses the politics of banking and fiscal union in the EU in the context of continued threats to financial stability in Europe. Contrasting the expectations of functional responses and power politics, it finds that the behavior of the states and the outcome of negotiations most closely resembles contemporary realist expectations. Minimal supranationalism takes place to prevent complete collapse, but the main development is that financially powerful member states coerce and impose changes on weaker member states, without committing to the financial transfers that the latter require to survive the financial crisis, with negative consequences for European financial stability.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
