Power of the weak? Framing strategies in fiscal redistribution negotiations

Abstract

ABSTRACT In fiscal redistribution negotiations, fiscally weaker sub-units aim to secure more funding but are disempowered by their dependency and lack of bargaining chips. What kind of negotiation strategies do fiscally weak actors rely on to maximize their bargaining positions in redistributive negotiations? The article puts forward a novel strategy of discursive framing whereby relatively powerless actors can reach successful agreements. Two strategies of framing, communitarian and coercive, are observed inductively through a comparative case study analysis of two instances of sub-federal redistribution negotiations in Canada. The findings reveal that ‘more is not always better’: more publicity and aggression can backfire, while communitarian strategies grounded in normative argumentation can prove effective despite their non-confrontational nature. Even a mixed communitarian-coercive strategy can prove effective given that sub-units remain consistent with their initial objectives and apply pressure incrementally. The lessons learned from these Canadian cases have broader implications for studying the dynamics of redistributive negotiations globally.