Power Games for Secure Communications in Single-Stream MIMO Interference Networks

Abstract

We propose a distributed interference management method for a single-stream MIMO interference network that is tapped by an external eavesdropper. Along with its information signal, each legitimate transmitter creates a bogus signal, known as transmit-based friendly jamming (TxFJ), to confuse the eavesdropper. Although generating TxFJ protects the link from eavesdropping, it creates interference at other unintended but legitimate links. Using non-cooperative game theory, we design a distributed method for maximizing the sum of secrecy rates. Each link is a player in the game. It seeks to maximize its secrecy rate subject to a given information-rate constraint and power budget. The strategy profile of each player is to control the amount of TxFJ it generates. Because a pure non-cooperative game may not have Nash equilibria that result in (Pareto-)optimal secrecy sum-rate, we propose a modified price-based game, in which each link is penalized for generating interference on other legitimate links. Under the exact knowledge of eavesdropping channels, we show that the price-based game has a comparable secrecy sum-rate to a centralized approach. We then relax the assumption of knowledge of eavesdropping channels and leverage mixed-strategy games to provide robust solutions to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization problem.