Abstract
This paper investigates two different anti-jamming scenarios for wireless networks in which there exist one jammer and multiple users. The jammer jams all the users simultaneously. In one scenario, the users and the jammer sense the opponent’s information, and take appropriate strategies accordingly. This scenario is modeled as a Stackelberg game in which the jammer acts as a leader, and the users act as followers. In another scenario, the users and the jammer take actions simultaneously and the anti-jamming problem is modeled as a static game. The existence and uniqueness of game equilibrium are proved. Closed-form expressions of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) and the Nash equilibrium (NE) are derived. Simulation results are presented to validate our theoretical analysis. It is shown that the users’ average utility of the SE is lower than that of the NE since the jammer can reduce the users’ utilities by utilizing the leader advantage to improve its own utility.
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