Abstract
AbstractPower concentration may impede bottom‐up information flow. This article argues that strong ruling party control may facilitate the power concentration of ruling elites, which breeds reticence and impedes bottom‐up information flow. Using Chinese municipal congresses as a case, I establish that strong ruling party control significantly reduces the number of policy proposals, suggestions, and criticisms from legislators. The reduction effect of ruling party control on upward information is more salient when party leaders are expected to gain power in the future. Further analysis rules out alternative mechanisms: leadership style, composition of legislators, and local grievance.
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