Abstract
At ISC 2001 a method for securing elliptic curve point multiplication against side-channel attacks has been proposed by Möller [Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2200, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2001, pp. 324–334]. We show that this method does not offer acceptable security. Namely, differential and simple power analysis techniques may reveal the complete secret key.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
