Power and stability in connectivity games

Abstract

We consider computational aspects of a game theoretic approach to network reliability. Consider a network where failure of one node may disrupt communication between two other nodes. We model this network as a simple coalitional game, called the vertex Connectivity Game (CG). In this game, each agent owns a vertex, and controls all the edges going to and from that vertex. A coalition of agents wins if it fully connects a certain subset of vertices in the graph, called the primary vertices.We show that power indices, which express an agent's ability to affect the outcome of the vertex connectivity game, can be used to identify significant possible points of failure in the communication network, and can thus be used to increase network reliability. We show that in general graphs, calculating the Banzhaf power index is #P-complete, but suggest a polynomial algorithm for calculating this index in trees. We also show a polynomial algorithm for computing the core of a CG, which allows a stable division of payments to coalition agents.