Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.

Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia,Dirk Helbing,Sergi Lozano

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099039

Abstract

Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

Highlights

At virtually all levels of human societies, socio-economic transactions are determined by the balance of power between parties
In the past, bargaining situations, and the Ultimatum Game (UG) in particular, have received large attention in the scientific literature, mostly because they highlight the importance of social preference in explaining human motivations beyond the standard rationality assumption [2]
While offers and acceptance rates vary almost predictably with the balance of power, other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), do not change with the amount of power

Summary

Introduction

At virtually all levels of human societies, socio-economic transactions are determined by the balance of power between parties. In the past, bargaining situations, and the Ultimatum Game (UG) in particular, have received large attention in the scientific literature, mostly because they highlight the importance of social preference in explaining human motivations beyond the standard rationality assumption [2]. Small offers are rejected and accepted offers tend to come close to equity [2,4]. This holds, albeit with certain caveats, across a large variety of cultural and social contexts [5,6] (for a recent overview of the literature on ultimatum bargains, see the review by Guth and Kocher [7])

Methods

Results

Conclusion