Abstract

This paper addresses power allocation problem for spectrum sharing multi-band cognitive radio networks, where the primary user (PU) allows secondary users (SUs) to transmit simultaneously with it by coding SU's signal together with its own signal. The PU acts as the relay for the SUs and sells its transmit power to the SUs to increase its benefit, and the SUs bid for the PU's transmit power for maximizing their utilities. We propose a power allocation scheme based on traditional ascending clock auction, in which the SUs iteratively submit the optimal power demand to the PU according to the PU's announced price, and the PU updates that price based on all SUs' total power demands. Then we mathematically prove the convergence property of the proposed auction algorithm (i.e., the auction algorithm converges in a finite number of clocks), and show that the proposed power auction algorithm can maximize the social welfare. Finally, the performance of the proposed scheme is verified by the simulation results.

Highlights

  • With the rapid deployment of wireless services in the last decade, the scarcity in radio spectrum emerges a critical issue for wireless communications

  • We propose a power allocation scheme based on traditional ascending clock auction, in which the secondary users (SUs) iteratively submit the optimal power demand to the primary user (PU) according to the PU's announced price, and the PU updates that price based on all SUs' total power demands

  • Our main contributions are as follows: First, we propose a power allocation scheme based on traditional ascending clock auction (ACA-T), in which the SUs iteratively submit the optimal power demand to the PU according to the PU’s announced price, and the PU updates that price based on all SUs’ total power demands

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Summary

Introduction

With the rapid deployment of wireless services in the last decade, the scarcity in radio spectrum emerges a critical issue for wireless communications. The authors in [6] formulated the resource allocation problem as a two-tier game, in which each PU acts as a relay for multiple SUs and sells the unused radios to SUs. the studies in the literature on PU-assisted cooperative communications in spectrum sharing CR networks are still relatively sparse, and how to control the transmit power at the PU for secondary transmissions remains an open problem. In order to address both system efficiency and user fairness issues of CR networks, the authors in [14] proposed a distributed power control strategy by using a cooperative Nash bargaining game model. In [17], the authors considered auction-based power allocation in multi-band CR networks, where multiple SUs transmit via a common relay, and bid for the transmit power of the relay. The performance of the proposed scheme is verified by the simulation results

Network Modeling and Notations
Problem Formulation
SUs’s Utility Function
C PU gRPU
Power Auction Mechanism
Payment
Simulation Results
Conclusions

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