Potential centrifugal effects of majoritarian features in proportional electoral systems

Abstract

ABSTRACT Many scholars argue that proportional representation (PR) has fragmenting and polarizing effects on party systems (centrifugal effects), while the use of single-member districts has moderating effects (centripetal effects). Beyond these two extremes, in order to combat the potential negative consequences of fragmentation and polarization on government, PR systems can incorporate majoritarian features as a moderating influence. We examine this relationship by considering the conditions under which majoritarian features can backfire and contribute to a more extreme government. We present a theoretical example to illustrate this effect across a range of majoritarian rules and highlight the importance of coordination. To stress that our example is not simply a theoretical possibility, we discuss the cases of Poland (2015), Hungary (2014), and Greece (2015), which incorporate majoritarian features through, respectively, a high election threshold, single-member districts, and bonus seats to the plurality winner. We argue that these elements in each case contributed to the legislative power of extreme, populist parties.