Possible Worlds Model Theory

Abstract

Kripke transformed both the model theory of modal logic and the understanding of metaphysical modality. In particular, he analysed the model-theoretic conditions for the Barcan formula and its converse to hold. However, the relation between the model theory of modal logic and the correctness of formulas on their metaphysical readings is not straightforward. To mediate between them, a notion of metaphysical universality is defined such that an intended model structure (on the metaphysical reading) should validate all and only metaphysically universal formulas. Technical problems for defining intended model structures arise in both propositional and first-order modal logic; there may be ‘too many’ worlds and ‘too many’ individuals. Given that these problems can be overcome, a special reason is explained why contingentism but not necessitism forbids an intended model structure for quantified modal logic. But even granted necessitism, it is controversial which first-order modal formulas are metaphysically universal.