Abstract

In the days before situation semantics1, some of us who wished to take a little of the metaphysical wind out of the sails of possible worlds semantics took to referring to possible worlds as “possible situations.” Now that the term “situation” has been pre-empted — tied to a certain theory and a certain ideology — I suppose those who still like possible worlds ought to find a new label. On the other hand, maybe it wouldn’t be so bad to use terminology which helps to blur the line between situations, in the new technical sense of Jon Barwise and John Perry, and possible worlds. I think the contrasts and conflicts between these notions, and between the respective theories or frameworks which take their names from them, have been exaggerated. There may be important substantive differences, technical and philosophical, between situation semantics and one or another formulation of possible worlds semantics, but they need to be characterized more sharply than they have been before the notions and theories can be compared.

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