Abstract
Recently, interest has surged in similarity-based epistemologies of possibility. However, it has been pointed out that the notion of ‘relevant similarity’ is not properly developed in this literature. In this paper, I look at the research done in the field of analogical reasoning, where we find that one of the most promising ways of capturing relevance in similarity reasoning is by relying on the predictive analogy similarity relation. This takes relevant similarity to be based on shared properties that have structural relations to the property of interest. I argue that if we base our epistemology of possibility on similarity reasoning on the predictive analogy similarity relation, we require prior knowledge of the specifics of these structural relations. I discuss a number of possible responses to this on behalf of the similarity theorists given their methodological approach to the epistemology of modality more generally. They could either opt for making explicit the metaphysics underlying these structural relations, in which case they need to spell out how we can come to know these relations. Or they could opt for developing a theory that explains why we do not need to have explicit knowledge of these structural relations; for example by suggesting that we make use of epistemic shortcuts.
Highlights
There has been an increased interest in similarity-based approaches to the epistemology of possibility (Roca-Royes, 2007, 2017; Hawke, 2011, 2017; Leon, 39 Page 2 of 22Synthese (2022) 200:392017; Dohrn, 2019)
I contribute to the furthering of similarity-based epistemologies by looking at the research done in the field of analogical reasoning, where we find a broad spectrum of many different kinds of similarity relations that one can use in similarity reasoning
The above is just a systematic way of describing similarity reasoning according to (GSA): we find that Messy and Twin Messy share a number of properties and on the basis of this we might conclude that they share a further property, the hypothetical analogy
Summary
According to the similarity theorists, I am justified in having this belief due to the fact that I believe that this wine glass is (relevantly) similar to another wine glass I once had that did break. The attractiveness of this view comes from the fact that it is intuitively plausible and promises to ground knowledge of non-actual possibilities in our knowledge of actuality. 346; see Goodman, 1972; and Morreau, 2010) The challenge this raises for theorists relying on (SA) is that they need to develop a notion of relevant similarity that distinguishes between good and bad instances of the similarity argument. I will use ‘it is possible that this object has this property’ and ‘this object could possibly have this property’ interchangeably
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