Abstract

Temporal preferences of animals and humans often exhibit inconsistencies, whereby an earlier, smaller reward may be preferred when it occurs immediately but not when it is delayed. Such choices reflect hyperbolic discounting of future rewards, rather than the exponential discounting required for temporal consistency. Simultaneously, however, evidence has emerged that suggests that animals and humans have an internal representation of time that often differs from the calendar time used in detection of temporal inconsistencies. Here, we prove that temporal inconsistencies emerge if fixed durations in calendar time are experienced as positively related (positive quadrant dependent). Hence, what are time-consistent choices within the time framework of the decision maker appear as time-inconsistent to an outsider who analyzes choices in calendar time. As the biological clock becomes more variable, the fit of the hyperbolic discounting model improves. A recent alternative explanation for temporal choice inconsistencies builds on persistent under-estimation of the length of distant time intervals. By increasing the expected speed of our stochastic biological clock for time farther into the future, we can emulate this explanation. Ours is therefore an encompassing theoretical framework that predicts context-dependent degrees of intertemporal choice inconsistencies, to the extent that context can generate changes in autocorrelation, variability, and expected speed of the biological clock. Our finding should lead to novel experiments that will clarify the role of time perception in impulsivity, with critical implications for, among others, our understanding of aging, drug abuse, and pathological gambling.

Highlights

  • Suppose we are asked to choose between $10 or $11 tomorrow

  • Temporal preferences of animals and humans often exhibit inconsistencies, whereby an earlier, smaller reward may be preferred when it occurs immediately but not when it is delayed. Such choices reflect hyperbolic discounting of future rewards, rather than the exponential discounting required for temporal consistency

  • Our finding should lead to novel experiments that will clarify the role of time perception in impulsivity, with critical implications for, among others, our understanding of aging, drug abuse, and pathological gambling

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Summary

Introduction

Suppose we are asked to choose between $10 or $11 tomorrow. We may prefer the $10 immediately rather than the $11 received after a day. We would want to reverse it, asking for the $10 immediately, rather than waiting the extra day we seemed to have been willing to accept in the past This time inconsistency can be modeled using hyperbolic discounting of future rewards (Laibson, 1997). The loss when s = 2 arrives late (3 units under the biological clock) is weighted less, because it occurs farther in time; it is discounted with exp(−3); the weighted value in that case is exp(−3)*0.538 = 0.027. With positive dependence, the decision maker will always prefer to wait when comparing options in the future for which she is indifferent That is, she looks more patient when deciding about payoffs in the future. The decision maker looks more patient in the immediate future than when considering options in the far future

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