Abstract

Abstract The chapter clarifies the mechanism for establishing state responsibility for ‘modern slavery’ in human rights law, which is grounded in the doctrine of positive obligations. It explains how positive obligations apply in the context of rights which are considered ‘absolute’, especially when the interference with such rights stems from the conduct of non-state actors. The discussion considers positive human rights obligations in general, their origins, rationale, nature, and scope. Particular attention is paid to the difference between rights infringements by state and non-state actors and the often neglected distinction between positive obligations and remedies for established human rights violations. The chapter finally explores several taxonomies of positive obligations proposed in the literature, and explains why the matrix comprising of general and specific obligations serves as the best analytical lens for examining the evolving human rights jurisprudence on state responsibility to address ‘modern slavery’.

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