Position-Taking as Democratic Representation

Abstract

A fundamental question in the study of American government concerns the extent to which our democracy is representative. Students have explored whether governmental decision-makers respond to the preferences of their constituents. Most studies have asked whether the content of laws that are enacted reflects public preferences. I argue that beyond policy responsiveness, representation takes place through position-taking by elected representatives. Position-taking is a form of public posturing that can convey information about constituent opinion to other decision-makers. I outline a simple formal logic for legislative position-taking. I then show that a correlation between public opinion and bill sponsorship, net of a legislator’s preferences, implies that less well-informed elites can learn about public opinion by observing position-taking. Original evidence on state-level opinion and bill sponsorship is used to demonstrate the effect of public opinion on position-taking. The evidence indicates that public opinion is given voice in governmental decision-making and that elites who want to learn about public opinion can do so by observing symbolic position-taking by members of the House.