PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AS THE PRESIDENT'S CALCULATIONS: LOYALTY, COPARTISANSHIP, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT IN SOUTH KOREA

Don S Lee

doi:10.1017/jea.2018.16

Abstract

AbstractHow do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party.

Highlights

How do the president’s calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed
Hypothesis 1 suggests that high-policy posts should be more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers than political-leverage posts, so the coefficient on high-policy should be positive (Model 1)
I have demonstrated how the distribution of cabinet appointments is systematically affected by presidential incentives to accomplish their goals in the government: Korean presidents are strategic in their assignment of posts, treating ministers differently based on their party affiliation

Summary

Introduction

How do the president’s calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. This forms the basis of my fifth and six hypotheses: Hypothesis 5: As the president’s support in the legislature increases, high-policy posts are more likely to go to nonpartisan ministers than political-leverage posts.

Results

Conclusion