Abstract

Abstract Whereas the first four chapters of this book have sought to articulate the content and implications of the principle of freedom of expression and have likewise sought to justify the sway of that principle as a moral absolute, the present chapter seeks to rebut some sophisticated arguments that have been propounded in recent decades by Rae Langton and other analytic feminist philosophers (including Ishani Maitra, Mary Kate McGowan, and Jennifer Hornsby) on the topic of pornography. With the aid of J.L. Austin’s speech-act philosophy, Langton has argued that the widespread availability of hard-core pornography in a society constitutes the subordination of women and causes the silencing of women. This chapter, the longest in the book, first refutes Langton’s claims about the constituting of women’s subordination and then contends that her claims about the causation of silencing—even if correct—are otiose as considerations in support of legal restrictions on pornography.

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