Pornography as Representation: Aesthetic Considerations

Abstract

Recent arguments against pornography are being translated into action, with several American cities adopting or considering ordinances aimed at removing pornography from society. Many of the supporting arguments try to establish a causal link between pornography and direct harm to women. One objection is that the attitude taken toward women in pornography is inculcated in its audience, at least some of whom then translate this attitude into actions that directly harm women. Because the existence of such a causal chain has been questioned, some attacks on pornography simply hold that pornography systematically degrades women, that to degrade persons on the basis of contingent class membership is to strip them of their rightful human dignity, and so pornography should be censored because is defamatory and libelous.' But both the causal chain and defamation arguments hold that pornography is a certain sort of objectionable content and that that content can and should be censored. I wish to challenge the viability of these arguments and ordinances against pornography by taking an aesthetic standpoint and questioning their understanding of pornography as a certain represented content. Ethical objections to such ordinances often begin with their conflicts with the First Amendment or by questioning whether they will significantly reduce violence against women. I will consider neither of these matters, but restrict my discussion to the question of whether those who are attempting to combat pornography with a civil rights approach have adequately identified what makes representations pornographic. While I accept that much pornography is morally objectionable because it defames or degrades