Populism, Liberal Democracy, and Constitutionalism: An Unholy Trinity

Abstract

The new plague facing liberal democracy is authoritarian populist projects. Scholars have been grappling with discovering answers on how to safeguard liberal democracy in the face of authoritarian populist projects. Much of the legal academic discourse concerning the same has been centered around constitutional law innovations like unconstitutional constitutional amendments, revision clauses, defensive/militant democracy, or institutional mechanisms such as judicial institutions. Nonetheless, these tools have largely been unsuccessful in stopping or even halting authoritarian populist projects. This article will argue that authoritarian populist projects can ultimately only be prevented in the political arena and the electoral battleground. This can happen when united opposition forces either utilize their institutional leverages efficiently and impede authoritarian populist projects or win elections and prevent the re-emergence of populist autocrats. This article will also make the ambitious claim that in countries susceptible to populism, to prevent authoritarian populist projects, ultimately, authoritarian populist projects might need to be countered with tools from the populist toolkit in ways that capture people the populace’s imagination in the same way as authoritarian populist projects.