Abstract
Abstract Why do scarce Indian women pay dowry to secure grooms even as the sex-ratio of offspring is manipulated by parents? We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of demographic and marriage market outcomes with endogenous gender preference. We find, that under a calibration of parameters suggested by Indian marriage market indicators, any long run steady state equilibrium must have both dowry and a masculine sex ratio. The key assumption that generates this result is the asymmetric marital preferences of men and women regarding own and spouse’s ideal age at marriage.
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