Population Behavioral Dynamics and Government Response to COVID-19 Prevention in Uganda: Insights from Economic Epidemiology and Game Theory

Abstract

This paper attempts to account for the role of population behavioral dynamics in urgent public health investment-decision making during outbreak of pandemics such as COVID-19. We developed game theory simulations based on the rational epidemics theory of infectious diseases to illustrate population behavior and rational decision making by government prior provision of preventive care during a pandemic such as COVID-19. We discuss the optimal time for government to invest in preventive healthcare such as public provision facemasks at different levels of disease prevalence. From our simulations, it is irrational for government to make a direct investment in preventive healthcare such as public provision of free facemasks to the populations during low disease prevalence (for example, during wave one of COVID-19 in Uganda). For instance, a time when diseases prevalence is below the threshold prevalence for which individuals/population is willing to demand for and utilize protective healthcare such as facemasks to protect themselves from contacting the disease (COVID-19). We conclude that the timing for government investment in relation to disease prevalence levels is critical. Second, during low disease prevalence, government should invest more in health promotion since preventive health care could result into allocative inefficiency. Third, any direct investment in preventive health care should go to the most at risk individuals even when the entire population is seemingly at risk.