Popper’s analysis of the theory of evolution

Abstract

In this paper I will deal with Popper?s analysis of the theory of evolution. Relying on his methodological teaching, known as falsificationism, Popper sought to determine whether it can be said that this significant biological theory is testable. Two directions of Popper?s critique can be selected: 1) one critique shows that theory of evolution can not formulate scientific law and that, therefore, it can not predict; 2) the second critique shows that the principle (or, in Popper?s own words, theory) of natural selection is a tautology - principle of natural selection is simple logical truth which, according to Popper, implies the lack of empirical content of that principle and, consequently, its impossibility to be tested. Conclusion of his analysis is that we ought to look at the theory of evolution, together with the theory of natural selection, as a productive metaphysical research programme. He changed his view on the theory of natural selection in the paper Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind, where he argued that the theory of natural selection is in certain sense testable, that it is not a tautology, but that it is not universally true and he gave up on characterizing that theory as a metaphysical research programme. The aim of this paper is to select the most relevant moments of Popper?s critique and to place them in the context of his methodological teaching.