Popper and the Omics.

Robert Winkler

doi:10.3389/fpls.2016.00195

Abstract

Popper and the Omics.

Highlights

Laboratory of Biochemical and Instrumental Analysis, Department of Biotechnology and Biochemistry, CINVESTAV Unidad Irapuato, Irapuato, Mexico
The prediction of future events from past observations might be plausible and could appear to be in agreement with our experiences, but the derivation of natural laws or theories cannot be justified by fitting observations into a model. This “problem of induction” was introduced by Hume in the eighteenth century (Hume, 1748) and is generally accepted in epistemology. Popper illustrates this fundamental problem in the theory of knowledge creation with his famous example of white and black swans: “ it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white” (Popper, 1959)
Since it might be impossible to verify truth, even assuming infinite data, Karl Popper suggested the concept of falsifiability (Popper, 1959): Instead of collecting evidence in support of a certain hypothesis, the borders of the validity of a hypothesis are systematically explored by testing its possible theoretical consequences

Summary

Introduction

Transcriptomics, Proteomics, Metabolomics, and other -omics generate unprecedented amounts of experimental data about cells or tissues under certain conditions. From an epistemological point of view, merely fitting data into a model to explain observations is not sufficient; science should strive to describe simple and logical theoretical systems that are testable and that enable predictions (Popper, 1959).

Results

Conclusion