Polytope Games

Abstract

Starting from the definition of a bimatrix game, we restrict the pair of strategy sets jointly, not independently. Thus, we have a set P⊂ SmBSn, which is the set of all feasible strategy pairs. We pose the question of whether a Nash equilibrium exists, in that no player can obtain a higher payoff by deviating. We answer this question affirm- atively for a very general case, imposing a minimum of conditions on the restricted sets and the payoff. Next, we concentrate on a special class of restricted games, the polytope bimatrix game, where the restric- tions are linear and the payoff functions are bilinear. Further, we show how the polytope bimatrix game is a generalization of the bimatrix game. We give an algorithm for solving such a polytope bimatrix game; finally, we discuss refinements to the equilibrium point concept where we generalize results from the theory of bimatrix games.