Politics of the Demise of Healthcare Reform

Abstract

Millions of our citizens do not now have a full measure of opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health. Millions do not now have protection or security against the economic effects of sickness. The time has arrived for action to help them attain that opportunity and that protection.” The recent words of President Bill Clinton? No, the words of President Harry S. Truman. As early as 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his State of the Union Message, advocated “the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.” That same year, Senators Robert Wagner (D-NY) and James Murray (D-MT) and Representative John Dingell, Sr (D-MI) introduced the “Wagner/Murray/Dingell” bill, which proposed broadening Social Security to include a national health insurance system financed by a payroll tax. Fast forward to 1994. After a long and contentious 2-year battle to pass comprehensive healthcare reform, the Congress, President Clinton, and the American public find themselves no farther along in the process than their counterparts during the Roosevelt Administration. According to Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, “the public clearly told us that the idea of taking on the whole system, every aspect of it,” was unacceptable. The American public finds itself left in the wake of a reported record $46.1 million spent by health and business interests lobbying on healthcare reform, according to the group Citizen Action. Although healthcare reform was dead for the 103rd Congress, Americans still retained a whole new set of additions to the American lexicon—or at least those Americans living within the confines of the Washington Beltway. Hard, soft, and fast-track triggers, managed care, premium caps, purchasing cooperatives, community rating, single payer, and incremental reform were spread throughout the pages of daily newspapers and discussed on endless radio talk shows. Healthcare …