Politics in the science advising process

Abstract

I am convinced of the importance of science to government-and vice versa. I am also convinced of the need for a broker in this relationship and of the importance of the Science Advisers, past and present, in serving this brokerage role. I spent the years from 1961 to 1967 working for Jerome Wiesner and Donald Hornig who were the Science Advisers to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. When I left my industrial job to go to Washington, I had an idealized-even naive-image of the role of a scientist in government and of the Science Adviser in particular. The scientist should use his (no one even imagined “her”) expertise to analyze long-range technical problems that faced the government and to give advice to the politicians who would accept or reject it. The scientist was disinterested and rational. The politicians had to deal with messy concerns such as regional politics, short-term ‘ ‘brush fites , ’ ’ patronage, and bureaucratic maneuvering, including allocation politics within the Executive branch. After I had worked in the o&e a while, it was clear that the science advisory apparatus, no less than the politicians were affected by these messy concerns and that a successful apparatus was one that could deal with them effectively. Where the Science Adviser failed, he failed often because he did not take into account the politics of the situation. The Science Adviser’s most potent weapon was and is a reputation for clear, disinterested technical knowledge. If he can keep that reputation and at the same time understand and use the political process, he can be effective. If he does not use or understand the political process, he will be bypassed and ineffective, regardless of the quality of his technical advice. This paper illustrates this thesis by reviewing how three Science Advisers encountered and used “political” concerns such as regionalism, quick-f= solutions, bureaucratic maneuvering and patronage. I also discuss briefly some “failures” of