Abstract

The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that can be used to rank, compare, and essentially censure states. This article argues that the ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It explores this argument in the context of the United States’ efforts to combat trafficking in persons and find evidence that monitoring has important effects: Countries are more likely to criminalize human trafficking when they are included in the U.S. annual Trafficking in Persons Report, and countries that are placed on a “watch list” are also more likely to criminalize. These findings have broad implications for international governance and the exercise of soft power in the global information age.

Highlights

  • International politics is essentially about how states attempt to influence one another’s policies in ways they believe will contribute to their security and welfare

  • We focus on a form of social pressure that is increasingly common globally: performance indicators

  • This article argues that performance indicators can influence state policy outputs, especially when they are based on systematic monitoring, are comparative, are wielded by a respected actor or group/organization of actors, and are widely disseminated

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Summary

A Theory of Social Pressure

Information as Tacit Social Pressure How states attempt to influence one another is the core question in international relations. Indicators are exercises in social power that interact with the status of the ranker in the broader international community They can mobilize and inform domestic actors, embarrass specific policy makers, and sometimes even activate other transnational pressure and move markets. Powerful rankers, such as the United States, seem well aware of the possibilities, expending resources to collect reasonably credible information. With a total of 1,345 annual country ratings since inception, this reporting system is a good opportunity to examine the effect of monitoring and indicators on state trafficking policies. If the United States strategically monitors or shames states that are likely to criminalize human trafficking anyway, the analysis will over-estimate the effects of monitoring and rankings on policy. All sources and measurement details are listed in the supplementary materials (item 1)

Findings Preliminaries
Conclusion
DATA TABLE
MEDIA COVERAGE
Robustness tests for table 1
Robustness tests for Table 2
Does Criminalization cause aid?
Full Text
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