Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000 by Brian D. s> Taylor (review)

Abstract

i36 SEER, 83, I, 2005 monuments to the common Russian soldier, redesigning parts of the old city, were meant to demonstrate 'the vitality and civilizing capacity of the Russian tribe' (p. 123). 'Progress' blatantly confronting 'backwardness' helped to fuel revolutionary politics. The old and the new were juxtaposed in different ways in Soviet cities. Greg Castillo examines and castigates the contribution of Constructivism to the design of the Socialist city in reality and as utopia, including the demolition of 'superfluous' ancient buildings. Andrew Day provides a stimulating revisionist overview of 'the rise and fall' of Stalinist architecture and its 'complex, dynamic and often contentious interactions' (p. 173), focusing on the plan for the reconstruction of post-war Stalingrad. Mark Bassin's excellent contribution stresses the importance of nature in the socialist realist vision, illustrating how the natural world was reconciled with industrial construction in 'dynamic' landscapes. At its crudest, this could mean including a tractor in a winter forest scene, but in wartime the unadulterated landscape of the motherland under threat of despoilment byfashisty was allowed to appeal directly to the emotions. In the post-Soviet section Kathleen F. Frost discusses the heated debates over suitable monuments to Stalin's victims and Blair A. Ruble offers a fascinating glimpse of the new order in Iaroslavl', as modernity clashes with heritage, church with city authorities, private capital with public money in reclaiming and reshaping the town. This is a thought-provoking and attractively produced volume of essays, some based on archival sources, which use nuanced approaches to show how architectures and space in general both helped to shape and were shaped by identities national, local, social, ideological. It demonstrates just how often buildings, spaces and images speak more eloquently than written texts and illustrates the many rewards that historians can reap from an intelligent 'reading' of the built environment. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies LINDSEY HUGHES University College London Taylor,BrianD. Politics andtheRussian Army.Civil-Militagy Relations, I689-2000. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2003. xvi + 355 pp. Figures.Tables.Notes. Index. [i8.95: $26.oo (paperback). WELL within living memory, Latin-Americangovernmentswere characteristically a function of the military.But no longer, and it would be interestingto know why. In this and other cases a general theory of civil-military relationships might help, and studies of particular states can assist the development of such a theory. Like Latin America, Russia at one time had rulerswho were imposed by the army and who alwaysknew that they could be removed by the army. The eighteenth century,with itspalace revolutions, was the peak period for military 'sovereign power' intervention but, quite abruptly,the trend changed and by the twentieth century the Russian army officer was determinedly apolitical. At various junctures, when there was opportunityand cause to mount a coup, the army was markedlyreluctantto do so. Analysesof thesejunctures is the purposeof the book underreview. REVIEWS 137 The authorplaces the Decembrist Revolt as the turningpoint. This showed that militaryinterventioncould fail, painfully.It was followed by undercover surveillanceof officersand a cultof strictdisciplineand blindobedience which trainedthem to keep their heads down and their noses in. The last three tsars came to the throne smoothly,which was quite a new phenomenon for Russia. Dmitri Miliutin's reforms at the War Ministry meanwhile gave the more intelligent segment of the officer corps reason to think that defence of the realmcould makea fulfillingcareer,and drewits minds awayfrompolitics. When in 1905-o6 the army saved the regime it did so only because it was conditioned to obey the orders of its commander-in-chief, the Emperor; it deplored and resented its use in civil strife. In I917, again, the army was dragged into politics against its instincts. It could hardly continue its urgent task of defending the frontiers while sovereign power was in dispute, so it participated in the abdication of the Emperor. Under the Provisional Government, it was the need to pursue the war effectively that persuaded some officers to oppose the Bolsheviks. But this was far from a clear-cut intervention.The KornilovAffairwas hardlyan attemptedmilitarycoup, but a mess for which the prime ministerwas largely responsible,and most of the generalswere unenthusiastic. Jumping ahead, the military aspect of the I99...