Politics and Science: Reflections on Knight's Critique of Polany

Abstract

KNOWING of my admiration for both men, a colleague recently called to my attention Frank Knight's 1949 critique2 of Michael Polanyi's Science, Faith, and Society (1946).3 The reissue of the latter monograph4 in 1964 contained a new introduction by the author, but no reference was made to Knight's fundamental criticism. Because the issue raised by Knight seems too important to be ignored, there is perhaps some justification in my attempt to restate the differences between these two scholars in my own terms. This justification is strengthened by the continuing relevance of the issue at stake, especially with reference to the general methodological setting for modern science. As Knight notes at the outset of his review, Polanyi's implied equation of science and social order represents an interesting inversion of the more familiar, and hopefully discredited, view that sociopolitical problems are similar to problems in that scientific method is required for their solution. For Polanyi, orthodox method, as many persons think and talk about it, does not characterize process. Scientific problems, as well as social problems, or indeed all problems, involve personal evaluation. Knight offers his normally persuasive, yes, but . type of criticism to this elevation of intuitive perception (as opposed to observation) to a predominant role in discovery. Within limits he broadly accepts Polanyi's theory of progress. The differences between these two social philosophers which this paper discusses are indeed profound, but any treatment of such differences would be misleading if it were not prefaced by an emphasis on their agreement on many issues. Knight accepts, again within limits, Polanyi's eloquent defense of freedom in the community. More importantly, for purposes of this paper, both Knight and Polanyi assign a major role to the spontaneous co-ordination process represented by market exchange broadly conceived in the social constitution for their good societies. Both generally and in particulars they share an avowed opposition to the authoritarian state, and both openly support individual freedoms defined in the terms of classical liberalism. What is at issue between Knight and Polanyi is the legitimacy of the same defense of freedom in science and in the political order. Is social like organization? Can norms or principles for organization that seem demonstrably appropriate for the community of science be extended by analogy and analysis to the social or political order? Both directly and by implication if not by major emphasis Polanyi's answer to these questions is affirmative. Knight's response is an emphatic negative. In essence, Polanyi seems to say: Have respect for truth, and you shall be free. Knight seems to respond by saying: But sociopolitical questions cannot be answered by 'true' or 'false.' Things are not nearly so simple as that. Michael Polanyi, the optimist, confronts Frank Knight, the pessimist. They look at political process through quite different windows. The waning prospects for advancing toward the social order that both Knight and Polanyi seek (or even preserving the achievements made) may depend critically on some reconciliation of their opposing views, or if not reconciliation at least mutual understanding. Modern liberalism advances, and confusedly oversteps itself, often on the basis of arguments that are at least akin to Polanyi's. Classical liberalism