Politicisation management in the European Union

Abstract

ABSTRACT Politicisation in the EU is mostly analysed as a domestic-level process constraining EU-level actors. Yet EU actors also engage in strategic politicisation management. This article theorises the conditions under which EU actors engage in either depoliticisation or politicisation strategies when they react to bottom-up pressures. It stipulates that politicisation management depends on the actors and issue context in question. Elected EU actors choose politicisation strategies, in particular if they represent challenger parties, deal with domestically salient and core state policies and are close to elections. By contrast, unelected EU actors prefer depoliticisation strategies except in the context of inter-institutional conflict. The politicisation of high-risk policies also produces depoliticisation. Recent empirical studies provide support to these conjectures and suggest that strategic politicisation management allows EU actors to maintain considerable room of manoeuvre.