Politically Motivated Opposition to War1

Abstract

Ever since Thucydides suggested that the Athenian expedition to conquer Sicily in 415 bc was driven in part by Alcibiades' attempt to use a foreign victory to promote his own political fortunes (Thucydides 1996:Book VI), observers have noted attempts by political elites to bolster their domestic positions through adventurous foreign policies and wars. Shakespeare suggested to statesmen that “Be it thy course to busy giddy minds/With foreign quarrels,” and Bodin argued that “the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to…find an enemy against whom [the subjects] can make common cause” (cited in Levy 1989). The tendency for foreign crises and wars to generate “rally-‘round-the-flag” effects that increase popular support for political leaders is often explained in terms of the “in-group/out-group”(or “conflict-cohesion”) hypothesis (Coser 1956). Conflict with an out-group increases the cohesion of the in-group and support for the group leader. Anticipating this, leaders beset by domestic problems may be tempted to engage in hostile action against an external adversary. The “diversionary theory of war” is now a major research program in the field, and a good example of how a combination of statistical, formal-theoretic, and case study research can contribute significantly to the cumulation of knowledge. The theory posits strategic behavior by the governing elite and a nearly automatic surge of popular enthusiasm and support, but gives little, if any, attention to the role of organized political opposition to the government.2 In focusing on the political incentives of the government and neglecting those of the opposition, scholars have missed an important implication of diversionary theory. Just as political leaders sometimes use military force to advance their domestic interests, the domestic opposition sometimes actively opposes war and tries to prevent the government from initiating it because the opposition expects …