Political vulnerability and alliance restraint in foreign policy: South Korea’s territorial issue

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the varying intensity of political clash that South Korea has got involved in with Japan regarding the territorial dispute, Dokdo/Takeshima. Existing works are limited to acknowledging the role of nationalism as a key obstacle to the negotiation or settlement of the territorial dispute. However, democratically elected Korean leaders at times remained low key in the territorial problem and even sought collaboration with Japan despite the existence of nationalism. Specifically, South Korea employed both calm and hardline diplomatic choices in the territorial dispute. Why did South Korea choose disparate territorial policies despite the population’s anti-Japanese sentiments? Under what circumstances did leaders in Korea employ dovish diplomacy that might cause a strong backlash from the public? Introducing the vulnerability-restraint theory, I argue that top decision makers’ political vulnerability in domestic politics and the restraining pressure from the United States have impact on the final choice of foreign policy.