Political Support for Courts in Democratic Transitions: Evidence from the 2011-12 Egyptian Elections

Abstract

What influences the preferences political elites have regarding judicial independence and powers when transitioning to a new democratic regime? How does the institutional structure of the new democratic regime and their experience as an autocracy influence these preferences? Do theories of judicial independence developed for democracies help us predict these preferences? In this paper, I examine these questions by using data from a survey of 198 candidates competing for parliamentary seats in the 2011-12 elections in Egypt. I exploit a unique experiment in political learning provided by the staggered nature of the Egyptian elections to explore how elite preferences change as information about the partisan composition of parliament they will face in parliament reduces the political uncertainty in the environment. I examine whether separation of powers embodied in Egypt’s presidential system, party engagement of aspirin parliamentarians and prior experience with elected office among other factors influence preferences of these candidates over executive and parliamentary oversight over the judiciary especially as they learn the results of earlier stages using various probit models. The results are nuanced and, show that considerable attention to the institutional and political context needs to be exercised when applying existing theories to explain judicial politics in such autocracies.